

NATURAL SEMANTIC METALANGUAGE AS A TOOL FOR ENVISIONING THE WORLD TRANSFORMED AND ENGAGING IN TRANSFORMING THE WORLD

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ABSTRACT

We look at pitfalls encountered while sharing our promises, dreams, and visions for the world with others, and how clarifying some basic linguistic principles and employing a special kind of metalanguage – a language for talking about language -- may help others move beyond these pitfalls.

SHARING A VISION OF THE WORLD TRANSFORMED

I promise, by 2020, everyone a gift. By this, I mean: I say that, in 2020 or at some time before that year, you and I and all other people will be able to look in this place and in all other places (in the world) and see [all of us] doing things with [each other], thinking “You [each] are like something someone is giving me as a present”, feeling something good because of that, wanting to do good things [for each other] because of that, and coming to do [those] things for [each other] because of that. I say this, wanting you and me and all other people to come to think: “These things will come to happen because of this.” And I say this, thinking, “Now you and I and all other people will come to do many things, and, because of this, at some time after now, in the year called 2020 or at some time before that year, [all of us] will come to see all of these things happening -- in this place and in all other places (in the world). This is my vision of the world transformed, and this is what I am promising. – Christopher C. Jones, 2005

How do we share with others our vision of the world transformed? Through language. People who have trained and developed themselves to the point of declaring an impossible promise for the world — or sharing with others their vision of the world transformed — share their promises, dreams, and visions with others through language. If our promises cannot be shared with others — that is, if they cannot be said, heard, and ‘gotten’ by others — then they have little or no chance of ever coming into existence in reality. Moreover, if our sharing our vision of the world transformed does not itself call forth further action from ourselves and others, we will more than likely fail in bringing about a world transformed. Therefore, the *say-ability*, *get-ability*, and *engage-with-ability* of impossible promises seem to be pre-requisites to their fulfillment, and all three of these pre-requisites have directly to do with language, with the languaging of the promises themselves, and with how we share them.

Envisioning the world transformed requires us to imagine as an outcome something that does not exist at the present time having come fully into existence by some future time. We have identified two major categories of pitfalls that have cost us a lot of time and energy over the four years since we declared our promises: (1) not understanding some basic concepts from linguistic theory and (2) assuming that our promises and the visions connected with them are *say-able*, *get-able*, and *engage-with-able* in public. This paper offers a summary of these pitfalls and how we have addressed them, as well as a languaging tool that we believe can help others with promises, dreams, and visions for the world side-step or move beyond these pitfalls in the future.

PITFALL TYPE #1: LINGUISTIC ILLITERACY

For the four years since we began working together, our resident linguist (Ruth) has, time and time again, challenged us to care about the impact that our lack of understanding of basic concepts from linguistic theory has had on our effectiveness with respect to engaging others in our promises. Little by little, we started checking out for ourselves whether these concepts would make a difference in our work, and gradually over time, we were inspired to spend this past year looking at them. In the process, we each got re-inspired by our work together and by our promises, and Ruth had the opportunity to re-visit the issues that had inspired her to create her impossible promise in the first place. What follows is Linguistic Literacy 101 for everyone who is out to transform the world.

“New” Language And “Speech Acts”

There are many ways that human beings can create “new” language. We can coin a new word or *neologism* that names (for example) a new kind of physical object that does not yet exist in reality. Having named it, we can talk about and interact with it as a concept while bringing it more and more into existence until it exists as a physical object in reality. Inventing the thing as a concept allows us to then invent how to bring it into reality. This frees us up to freely invent concepts before pathways towards realizing them.

Another way to invent something new in language is to – by the very act of saying something – perform or carry out some other act. The speaker’s words, when the speaker has been granted the authority to speak them, are considered sufficient to render the act accomplished and the proposition “X is the case” *true*. An example would be the words of San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom on February 12, 2004, when he said, “I pronounce you spouses for life”. The act of pronouncing two women “spouses for life” made that in fact the case. It took until the California Supreme Court ruled six months later that the mayor did not have the Constitutional authority to perform that act between members of the same sex and that the act of pronouncing the couple “spouses for life” was therefore invalid before the proposition “they are spouses for life” was declared an invalid pronouncement and no longer *true* by law.

Performative acts such as these are called *speech acts*. Our impossible promises – and all promises, for that matter – are speech acts. Before we say “I promise the world transformed”, the promise does not exist. After we say this, the promise exists. The action of saying “I promise the world transformed” is a declarative speech act that brings the promise into existence. If we do nothing further to invent how to bring our vision of the world transformed into reality, the promise will still exist as having been promised. It just won’t exist with much chance of fulfillment. In other words, “failures of circumstance *do not* invalidate the promise,” which still exists as something (*a possibility*) that has being in the present (anonymous reviewer, p.c.).

“Vicious Circles”

Another relevant concept from linguistics and philosophy is that of the “vicious circle”. Since at least as far back as Aristotle, thinkers have addressed the issue of circularity in defining what words mean. How do we write a dictionary definition using words that do not themselves need to be defined using the words we are trying to write definitions for in the first place? Introductory courses

in word meaning or “lexical semantics” have for years required beginning linguists to look up Word A in a dictionary, write down its definition, and then do the same with each word in that definition. If we do this painstakingly with each word in Word A’s definition, we will invariably (and usually very quickly) discover that Word A has been defined in terms of Word B or C or D, which have in turn been defined in terms of Word A. This is known as a *vicious circle* and is considered largely unavoidable in the writing of dictionaries.

For example, in the Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary, *think* is defined as consisting of a list of transitive and intransitive senses. The third “transitive sense” of *think* is listed as “3a: to have as an opinion, b: to regard as, *consider*.” Looking up *consider*, we find that its first “transitive sense” is defined as “to *think* about carefully: as a: to *think* of especially with regard to taking some action, b: to take into account.” Thus, *think* is defined in terms of *consider*, and *consider* is defined in terms of *think* -- in other words, by using a vicious circle.

Making Simple Things More Complex

Another issue that arises in the same exercise is that words are often defined in more complex terms than the word being defined. *Water*, for example, is defined in the same on-line dictionary in scientific terms that are learned long after the age at which we learn what water is and what it is called in our native language. Defining *water* as “the liquid that descends from the clouds as rain, forms streams, lakes, and seas, and is a major constituent of all living matter and that when pure is an odorless, tasteless, very slightly compressible liquid oxide of hydrogen H₂O which appears bluish in thick layers, freezes at 0° C and boils at 100° C, has a maximum density at 4° C and a high specific heat, is feebly ionized to hydrogen and hydroxyl ions, and is a poor conductor of electricity and a good solvent” fails to recognize that *water* is linguistically prior to any of the science relating to it. We can get along in life without ever learning or needing to learn the science required to make sense of this definition, but we cannot live without water. If we have and use human languages, then we will have a word or words to refer to and talk about that “something that all people drink.”

Assuming Every Language Is Like Your Own

Other common mistakes we can make with respect to language include that we assume that other languages are exactly like our own, that each word in our language has an exact equivalent word in every other language, and that each word distinguishes the same “semantic territory” as the word or words that are normally used to translate it in other languages. Ruth taught introductory linguistics in the US and English conversation for a decade in Japan and found that very few native speakers of any language are ever taught the fallacy of these assumptions. In fact, most people cannot bring themselves to believe that these assumptions are false even after having their validity disproven by numerous examples in their own language-learning experience.

Consider one example in which a Japanese student of English has been taught since junior high school that *kazoku* means “family”. The unsuspecting language learner thinks that the new word is substitutable for the native word in each and every context in which the native word is used. The Chinese characters for *kazoku* clearly signal that *kazoku* refers to “people living under one roof,” but the student never learns that *family* does not share this restriction. In only rare cases might a Japanese student of English have learned that *starting a family* is something couples do by having their first baby. Plugging the English words into what appears to be an equivalent Japanese phrase, she mistakenly assumes that *starting a family* means “getting married (and moving to one’s

own place).” Similarly, after insisting repeatedly to her English-speaking friends that “my family is two” [= my family consists of two people], the same student has no idea why more than one of her new English-speaking friends believe – after months of trying to verify their assumptions to the contrary – that the Japanese student had been orphaned before marrying. She cannot believe that unexamined assumptions about the nature and translatability of vocabulary might be the source of many of her language-learning difficulties.

All Definitions Are Alike In Quality

Another consequence of our linguistic illiteracy is that we believe that all definitions are alike in quality. We fail to recognize a good definition when we see it, and we fail to remember one exists even when there’s a demand for it. An interesting example comes from something we have observed over the last year and a half in seminars we have attended at Landmark Education. The seminar leaders seem to have the hardest time answering questions from participants about what “honoring one’s word” means. Like many native speakers encountering repeated questions from non-native speakers trying to learn their language, they seem to believe that repeating, “Well, you know, *honoring one’s word* means *honoring one’s word*,” enough times will magically cause the participants to come to understand them. Equally likely, though, is that it will frustrate the participants enough to have them stop asking the question.

Since the conversation always comes up during the section of the seminar session on the meaning of *integrity*, the seminar leaders could easily be trained to go to the manual and read the relevant section of the definition of *integrity* that is written in very simple language: “In other words, *honoring one’s word*: doing what you know to do, doing what you said you would do and on time, doing what others could expect you to do even if you haven’t said that you would do it, and saying when you are not doing this as soon as you realize you won’t be doing it or won’t be doing it on time.” This definition could be improved upon by translating the more complex parts – *what you know* and *know to do*, *on time*, *expect*, *even*, *as soon as*, and *realize* – into simpler language, which would make this powerful distinction translatable into any language and understandable by anyone.

A Language To Talk About Language

Dictionary writers have resolved most of the above issues by declaring that some subset of the language will be used as a *metalanguage*, a language to talk about language. For example, they might set aside 750 words in the language as “basic” and use them as the vocabulary with which to write definitions. The 750 words would then either be defined by other words on the list or be regarded as needing no definitions of their own because they are intuitively understandable by any adult speaker of the language. This solution has been used for many monolingual (English-English, Russian-Russian, Farsi-Farsi) dictionaries written for the native speakers of a language.

An additional complexity gets thrown in when the dictionary being written is for non-native speakers or second-language learners, such as English-German and German-English dictionaries or those for other pairs of languages. As soon as non-native speakers are involved, we cannot assume that the words in the metalanguage will be intuitively understandable. At least at some level, the words must be taught, and they are most commonly taught by having learners memorize a side-by-side list of words in the native and target languages. We saw in the preceding section that memorizing words without also learning their ranges of use or having a way of talking about their meanings in simple language leads to serious and often intractable problems for language learners.

These problems also negatively impact native speakers of the same language when we do not have the wherewithal to question these assumptions or to explain what we mean in simpler language.

Natural Semantic Metalanguage

What do we do if we don't know of any simpler language to use? We can re-invent the wheel, or we can turn to the experts and see if anyone has already been working on this in linguistics. One of the world's leading thinkers on the languaging of speech acts, Anna Wierzbicka [Veerzh-*bíts*-ka] works in linguistics from the perspective of testing and developing a natural language-based metalanguage for talking about meaning in human languages. Having picked up on Leibniz's insight "that languages are the best mirror of the human mind, and that a precise analysis of the significations of words would tell us more than anything else about the operations of the understanding," Wierzbicka and her colleagues have spent the past three decades empirically validating Leibniz's hypothesis that "there was at the heart of all languages a shared lexical and grammatical core – an 'alphabet of human thoughts' ('alphabetum cogitationum humanarum') and a common grammar ('Grammatica Generalis', 'Grammatica Philosophica')."

This *Natural Semantic Metalanguage* (or NSM) now consists of a 'vocabulary' of about 60 concepts or "innate conceptual primes" that are instantiated as "tangible words or word-like elements, with a shared set of combinatorial properties, in languages as diverse as Japanese and Russian, Malay and Ewe (West Africa), Lao and Mbula (New Guinea), Yankunytjatjara (Australia) and Spanish, Amharic (Ethiopia), and Chinese." The vocabulary of NSM in each language is a subset of the vocabulary of the language that can be combined in simple ways to "explicate" everything that human beings can talk about (See Table 1 for a list of NSM "primes" in three languages.)

An empirical hypothesis, NSM is not a static metalanguage – researchers continually check and re-check their work with the help of native speakers of the language being studied. Thus, all of the definitions in their publications are tested thoroughly with native speakers of each language being studied until the native speakers of that language can see nothing more that needs to be added to the definition and nothing more that needs to be removed or revised. This means that, as native speakers of English, we would have something useful and valid to say about definitions written for English in an NSM subset of English, but not about definitions written for Swahili in an NSM subset of Swahili.

At the same time, NSM is not a metalanguage of random origin, but one whose naturalness can be observed in the linguistic strategies people use when trying to understand one another. We can observe that when people talk about meanings of words, they use words to do so. In addition, our own linguist, Ruth, loves demonstrating that language skills can be taught using vocabulary like the primes found in NSM – not only to second language learners, but also to native speakers with unexamined assumptions about language. For example, she observes that when people think others cannot or have not understood them, they will try to get their idea across by saying it another way, and they will do so again and again in simpler and simpler words until they have gotten their idea across in much the same words as found in Table 1.

All in all, NSM looks like it could be very useful as a tool that would support us in our promises, helping us clarify what we mean, find points of agreement between our own work and that of others, and prepare the groundwork for when our promises truly go global.

Table 1. Examples of NSM Primes in Three Languages (Wierzbicka, p.c.)

	Russian	English	Spanish
Substantives	ja	I	yo
	ty	you	tú
	kto-to	someone (person)	alguién
	chto-to	something (thing)	algo
	ljudi	people	gente
Determiners	telo	body	cuerpo
	ètot	this	este
	totzhe samyj	the same	el mismo
Quantifiers	drugoj	other	otro
	odin	one	uno
	dva	two	dos
	nekotorye	some	algunos
Attributes	mnogo	many/much	muchos
	vse	all	todos
	xoroshij	good	bueno
	ploxoij	bad	malo
	bol'shoj	big	grande
Mental predicates	malen'kij	small	pequeño
	dumat'	think	pensar
	znat'	know	saber/conocer
	xotet'	want	querer
	chuvstvovat'	feel	sentir
Speech	videt'	see	ver
	slyshat'	hear	oír
	skazat', (govorit')	say (speak)	decir
	slova	word	palabra
Actions, events, movements	pravda	true	verdad
	delat'	do	hacer
	sluchit'sja	happen	suceder
Existence and possession	dvigat'sja	move	moverse
	sushchestvovat'	there is	hay (existir)
	imet'	have	tener
Life and death	zhit'	live	vivir
	umeret'	die	morir
Logical concepts	net	not	no
	mozhet byt'	maybe	quizás
	moch'	can	poder
	izza (potomu chto)	because	porque
	esli	if	sí
Time	kogda	when (time)	cuando
	teper'	now	ahora
	posle	after	antes
	do	before	después
	dolgo	a long time	mucho tiempo
	korotko	a short time	poco tiempo
	nekotoroe vremja	for some time	por un tiempo
Space	moment	for a moment	
	gde	where (place)	dónde
	zdes'	here	aquí
	nad	above	sobre
	pod	below	debajo
	daleko	far	lejos
	blizko	near	cerca
	storona	side	lado
vnutri	inside	dentro	
Intensifier	kazat'sja		
	ochen'	very	muy
Augmentor	bol'she	more	más
Taxonomy	rod	kind	género
Partonomy	chast'	part	parte
Similarity	kak (poxozhij)	like	como

PITFALL TYPE #2: ASSUMING SAY- AND GET-ABILITY

We turn now to the second category of pitfalls mentioned at the outset of this paper – that of assuming that our promises and the visions connected with them are *say-able*, *get-able*, and *engage-with-able* in public. In the list of 10 criteria that constitute a Certified Impossible Promise, the second criterion is “say-ability in public: a general understanding by the general public” (Barnett, et al. 2004). We have been interested for several years in what this actually means. Each of us has said our own and each other’s promises in public. Thus, at the simplest level, our promises are *say-able in public*. However, at a deeper level, we asked ourselves “What does *say-able in public* mean?” Does it mean that the saying of the promise is all that matters? What about the *get-ability* of it? Doesn’t an impossible promise also need to be *get-able in public*? And which *public* are we talking about? If we are talking about *engage-with-able in public* is that public engaging with us or with other people about what we said?

Sayability In Public

As a group, we came together because Judith had coined a new word (*Elderboomer*) to refer to a group of people – Babyboomers hitting retirement age, and we wanted to engage with her about how to leverage that group of people in the fulfillment of all of our promises. Judith’s promise in turn became a point of intersection for all of us: “By 2012, all people honoring themselves, each other, the planet, and the mystery of the universe.” Since then, we have been working together on distinguishing what *honoring* means and what “a world of *honoring*” might look like. At the same time, we have each been looking at our own visions of the world transformed and inquiring into whether or not what we are saying evokes responses from others that can tell us if they are envisioning something similar to what we ourselves have in mind or are heading in another direction.

The question of *say-ability*, thus, almost immediately turned into the question of *engage-with-ability*. Ruth tried out several ways of saying her promise before finally settling on the version she publicly declared. She incorporated what she learned from others’ responses into later formulations. Promising to “cause synergy among all people” elicited questions about what *synergy* meant. Promising to “generate partnerships through linguistic ministry” produced similar questions, of course, since Ruth was pointing to something that had never been named as such before: ministering to others through language. Asked what such a world might look like, she tried out promising “a world of grace, joy, forgiveness, and full self-expression, in which all people are creating themselves as ambassadors for humanity.” People responded accordingly, but at least had some idea of what Ruth’s vision of the world transformed looked like. In the end, she promised: “By 2020, all of us participating fully in all of life for all our lives”.

For much of our work together, we were assuming that the use of “the same words as us” meant that people were envisioning the same world transformed as we were. We went to events, courses, and conferences, surfed the internet, read books, went to movies, and watched the news, always on the alert for anyone else who seemed to be working on “the same thing” we were. We listened for people who languaged promises, dreams, and visions for the world in terms of *honoring*, *being honored*, *participation*, *being conscious*, and for any mention of *death* and *dying* (from Sharon’s promise, “By 2020, a world where death is celebrated, life honored, and communities inspired by the lives that pass through.”). We wrote down the names of other people with promises “similar to ours” and invited them into conversation with us. We emailed each other when one of us heard someone talk about an area another one of us was interested in, saying things to each other like “this

person is working on the same thing as you.” In other words, we were listening for the particular words of our promises and each others’ promises as if the words themselves existed on an equal footing as the promises and as if each others’ promises were different from our own. We were assuming that “the same wording” pointed to the same vision, and took similar wording as cues about who we wanted to be engaging with.

Get-ability In Public

So far, we have looked at the sayability of promises in general and how we have actually shared ours. Now, we will look at whether or not what we are saying is being ‘gotten’ or ‘heard’. We have reacted in various ways to people’s responses – with surprise, upset, frustration, or by being dumbfounded. The key has been to remember that every response can tell us something about how and whether we are being heard and what we can do to increase our chances of our being heard. Again, the point of being ‘gotten’ or ‘heard’ is to have people want to take action consistent with our vision of the world transformed – in other words, to come on board somehow as the ‘staff’ of the vision, dream, or promise for the world transformed. Here are some of the things we have been told when we have shared our promises – along with our responses to them.

“What do you mean by *that*?” Our first experience with using NSM to increase “get-ability” of a promise came three years ago when Deb started sharing her promise widely. She would tell people that she promises, “By 2022, all people consciously choosing their lives, all people being honored,” and their first question would be invariably be “What do you mean by *honoring*?” Frustrated with not having a ready answer, and not being sure she herself knew what she meant, Deb asked Ruth to help her to create a definition of *honoring* in NSM that reflected Deb’s use of the word. To Deb, *honoring* means “listening to another person, being glad that that person is alive and feeling something good because of that” -- with all but the word *glad* being said in the semantic primes of NSM.

Ever since then, Deb has been able to use this definition of “honoring” to engage people fully in her impossible promise. While leading one of our intergenerational honoring workshops at the University of South Florida’s Learning and Retirement Program, Deb shared this definition with the participants. She had them explore what they were willing to learn from people in other age-groups from their own and what they wanted to teach people in each of those age-groups. An 82-year-old man shared that he could see that he doesn’t listen to his children, that he expects them to listen to him, that he could now actually listen to them, and that he was moved by the prospect of listening to them. In addition, Deb’s sharing her definition of *honoring* with doctor and author Bill Thomas and with business coach Becky Nickol have been pivotal in their signing on to support us in the spread of our vision of the world transformed.

Chris originally promised “a world in which every person is honored and present to the miracle of life by 2020.” Over the past year, he revisited the languaging of his promise, too, and chose to change it to “By 2020, everyone a gift.” After Chris changed the wording of his promise, Ruth showed all of us how to go about paraphrasing each part of his promise in NSM. The easiest way to do this is to take each word or phrase that is not in NSM and keep asking “What does *that* mean?” until the person has been forced to “un-pack” their ideas into simpler and simpler terms until they have paraphrased everything in NSM. The parts are then assembled into one complete definition. (Chris’s promise is given in NSM in the opening quote of this paper.)

A few days after we distinguished the above, we had a guest, Peter Gales, on one of our weekly conference calls. Peter asked each of us to share our promises with him, and when Chris said, “I promise, by 2020, everyone a gift,” Peter’s response was, “What does *that* mean?!” Chris had believed that his promise was actually now simpler and more easily understandable, and would have been surprised by a question like Peter’s, but having done the work with NSM, found that he had developed his capacity to share not only his promise but also his vision of the world transformed in a way that was inspiring to all of us, including Peter.

We found that by doing the work to get Chris’s promise sayable in NSM expanded our capacity to share his promise and have people get it right away. NSM also allowed us to capture how impossible promises are different from everyday promises: We intend them to cause something in the world that involves all people, which has heretofore never occurred. They ultimately involve other people’s actions, not just our own. “I promise” in this context means “I say this, wanting you and me and all other people to come to think: These things will come to happen because of this. I say this, thinking: Now you and I and all other people will come to do many things, and because of this, after some time, you and I and all other people will come to see – in this place and in all other places – all of these things happening.”

“You can’t promise that!” Besides the usual “What do you mean by that?” response, Ruth has encountered some interesting responses to her promising “all of us fully participating”. Judith herself used to hear this as saying she would have to do something she didn’t want to do. Another woman responded in another way and threatened Ruth physically after hearing her promise. Her objection? That Ruth could only promise actions to be carried out by Ruth, so had no right to promise something involving her, much less all people. She then swore that she would not be participating in anything Ruth asked her to do from now on “just so Ruth wouldn’t get what she wanted.” The clarification of what “I promise” means, as well as an NSM version of Ruth’s promise have helped Ruth lay people’s fears to rest about being forced to do something or having someone else promise actions for them that they didn’t have a say about.

“I don’t like that word.” When Judith shared her promise at a conference in Europe last year, a man from Ireland objected to her use of the word *honoring* as something having positive value. He told her that, because people in his country associate the word *honoring* with the Catholic Church which they view negatively, no one would want to use the word in connection with something viewed as positive. That someone objected to her choice of the word *honoring* caught Judith by surprise, so it wasn’t until later that she realized she had missed an opportunity to find out what words the man himself would use to name or describe the positively-valued semantic territory Judith calls *honoring*.

As a result of our work on becoming linguistically literate, we have a newfound capacity to engage with people beyond our mutual linguistic barriers. When encountering an unexpected reaction from others, we can share with them that we have promised to bring about a world of *honoring* by 2020, and that this means that we are promising to be a certain way with them that we call *honoring*. They can recognize this way of being because if they were being this way, they would be thinking, “I know I am part of the world, you are part of the world, and all other things are part of the world. Because of this, I think ‘I am part of all other things, you are part of all other things, and all other things are part of you and me.’ I want to do good things for all of us because of this. I know, if I do some things, I can come to know which things are good things for all of us. I do these things because of this, and come to know which things are good things for all of us because

of that. I come to do these good things for all of us because of this, knowing I am doing them because I know they are good things for all of us. I feel something very good because of this.”

SUMMARY

All in all, with respect to the pitfalls we have encountered in sharing our promises, dreams, and visions for the world, we have found NSM to be a useful tool for increasing their *say-ability*, *get-ability*, and *engage-with-ability*. We discovered gaps in our knowledge of how languages work and what dictionaries are for, the filling of which would make a difference and came up against unexamined assumptions we didn't even know we held about the nature of human language: (1) that people will understand us just because we speak the same native language, (2) that people who use the same words we are using are talking about the same thing we are talking about, and (3) that people who use different words than we are using are talking about something different from what we are talking about. These gaps in our understanding and blocks to our understanding can – if not easily – be corrected or avoided by our undertaking to develop our “linguistic literacy.” Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), the tool that we have found most useful in making these corrections, provides us with a metalanguage in the literal sense – a language for talking about language. We intend NSM not to replace the fullness, richness, and creativity of our native languages in sharing our impossible promises, but to supplement them as a powerful tool for reducing misunderstandings, clarifying intentions, and discovering and recovering shared visions.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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